The Case for Mandatory Ownership Disclosure by Schouten, Michael C.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The Case for Mandatory Ownership
Disclosure
Michael C. Schouten
University of Amsterdam, Columbia Law School
8. March 2009
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14139/
MPRA Paper No. 14139, posted 18. March 2009 07:08 UTC
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1327114 
 
The Case for Mandatory Ownership Disclosure 
 
Michael C. Schouten∗ 
This version: March 13, 2009  
ABSTRACT 
The use of equity derivatives to conceal economic ownership of shares (“hidden 
ownership”) is increasingly drawing attention from the financial community, as is the 
exercise of voting power without corresponding economic interest (“empty voting”). 
Market participants and commentators have called for expansion of ownership 
disclosure rules, and policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic are now 
contemplating how to respond. Yet, in order to design appropriate responses it is key 
to understand why we have ownership disclosure rules in the first place. This 
understanding currently appears to be lacking, which may explain why we observe 
divergent approaches between countries. The case for mandatory ownership disclosure 
has also received remarkably little attention in the literature, which has focused 
almost exclusively on mandatory issuer disclosure. Perhaps this is because most 
people assume that ownership disclosure is a good thing. But why is such information 
important, and to whom? This paper aims to answer these fundamental questions, 
using the European disclosure regime as an example. First, the paper identifies two 
main objectives of ownership disclosure: improving market efficiency and corporate 
governance. Next, the paper explores the various mechanisms through which 
ownership disclosure performs these tasks. This sets the stage for an analysis of 
hidden ownership and empty voting that demonstrates why these phenomena are so 
problematic. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A “huge question for regulators and arguably an embarrassment for all European 
capital markets” is how one analyst responded to the news that carmaker Porsche 
used equity derivatives to silently build up a large stake in Volkswagen in the fall of 
2008.1 The use of equity derivatives to conceal economic ownership of shares 
(“hidden ownership”) is a phenomenon that is increasingly drawing attention from 
the financial community, as is the exercise of voting power without corresponding 
economic interest (“empty voting”).2 Market participants and commentators have 
called for expansion of ownership disclosure rules, and policymakers on both sides of 
the Atlantic are now contemplating how to respond. 
Yet, in order to design appropriate responses it is key for policymakers to 
understand why we have ownership disclosure rules in the first place. This 
understanding currently appears to be lacking, which may explain why we observe 
divergent approaches between countries.3 The case for mandatory ownership 
disclosure has also received remarkably little attention in the academic literature, 
which has focused almost exclusively on mandatory issuer disclosure.4 Perhaps this is 
because most people assume that ownership disclosure is a good thing.5 But why such 
information important, and to whom?  
This paper aims to answer these fundamental questions, using the European 
ownership disclosure regime as an example. A focus on the European regime is useful 
                                                
1 Richard Milne, Hedge Funds Hit As Porsche Moves On VW, FINANCIAL TIMES, Oct. 27, 2008. 
For a discussion of this case, see infra note 192 and accompanying text. 
2 The terminology has been introduced by Henry T. Hu & Bernard S. Black, The New Vote 
Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. Cal. L. Rev. 811, 815, 816 (2006). 
3 See EUROPEAN SECURITIES MARKETS EXPERT GROUP (ESME), FIRST REPORT OF ESME ON THE 
TRANSPARENCY DIRECTIVE 2 (2007) (suggesting that one of the reasons for the divergent approaches in 
different European countries appears to be the lack of a clear recognized reason for the imposition of the 
European disclosure regime). See also NIAMH MOLONEY, EC SECURITIES REGULATION 195 (Oxford 
University Press 2008) (noting that the European disclosure regime suffers from a lack of clarity as to 
its core objectives). 
4 For a comprehensive overview of this debate, see Merritt B. Fox, Artyom Durnev, Randall 
Morck & Bernard Y. Yeung, Law, Share Price Accuracy and Economic Performance: The New 
Evidence, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 331, 335-344 (2003). 
5 Cf. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD) PRINCIPLES OF 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 51 (2004) (referring to ownership disclosure as “one of the basic rights” of 
investors). 
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because this regime has been developed fairly recently and a number of justifications 
have been offered for it. It is also appropriate in light of the fact that the British 
Financial Services Authority (FSA), which operates within the European framework, 
has taken the international lead when it comes to adjusting ownership disclosure rules 
to changed market circumstances. However, the basic insights yielded by the paper 
can be applied universally and should be of interest to scholars and policymakers 
around the globe, including the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 
First, the paper identifies two main objectives of ownership disclosure rules: 
improving market efficiency and corporate governance (Part I). The paper then 
explores the different mechanisms through which ownership disclosure performs these 
tasks. This sets the stage for an analysis of hidden ownership and empty voting (Parts 
2 and 3, respectively). First, the paper briefly describes some recent high-profile cases 
that have occurred in Europe and in the US and that illustrate the dramatic effects of 
hidden ownership and empty voting. Next, the paper analyzes the extent to which 
these phenomena are captured by existing rules under the disclosure regime. The 
analysis suggests they are not, at least not effectively. Finally, the paper shows how 
these phenomena undermine the mechanisms through which ownership disclosure 
improves market efficiency and corporate governance. Thus, the paper enables a 
better understanding of why hidden ownership and empty voting are so problematic. 
The paper has several important policy implications (Part 4). In general, 
policymakers contemplating how to respond to hidden ownership and empty voting 
should not focus only on the most obvious problems caused by these phenomena, such 
as malfunctioning of the market for corporate control. Instead, they should take into 
account the whole range of adverse effects described in this paper. Specifically, the 
European Commission, which is currently evaluating the European ownership 
disclosure regime, should consider expanding the scope of the disclosure rules. In each 
case, policymakers should duly take into account the potential costs of increased 
disclosure, which are highlighted in this paper. The paper concludes by pointing at 
certain related issues that merit careful consideration, such as the issue of regulatory 
competition. 
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I. THE OBJECTIVES OF MANDATORY OWNERSHIP DISCLOSURE 
An obligation to disclose major shareholdings was introduced at European level in 
1988 with the “Large Holdings Directive”.6 This directive significantly improved 
transparency levels and enabled large-scale studies of control patterns in Europe.7 
However, its limited scope and application led observers to conclude that it was not 
generating the data it was supposed to.8 In 1999, the European Commission 
announced a range of measures to promote integration of European financial 
markets. One of the aims was to enable issuers to raise capital on competitive terms 
across Europe.9 To achieve this, the Commission intended to update existing 
disclosure obligations. This resulted in the Transparency Directive, which in its first 
recital states that  
“[t]he disclosure of accurate, comprehensive and timely information about 
security issuers builds sustained investor confidence and allows an informed 
assessment of their business performance and assets. This enhances both 
investor protection and market efficiency.”10  
To this end, according to the Directive, those who hold or have access to voting 
rights should disclose major holdings in listed companies.11  This information 
                                                
6 Council Directive 88/627/EEC, On the Information to be Published when a Major Holding in a 
Listed Company is Acquired or Disposed Of, 1988 O.J. (L 348) 62 (previous directives required 
issuers to disclose information on share ownership, but did not impose such duty directly on 
shareholders and required less disclosure). The European Commission’s rationale for proposing this 
directive was that investors would be provided with information on persons capable of influencing 
management; this would enable them to “follow developments in the company’s ownership and gain a 
clearer idea of what is happening internally.” This information, the Commission considered, might 
affect investors’ assessment of the securities and play a crucial role in their investment decisions. 
Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on the Information to be Published When Major 
Holdings in the Capital of a Listed Company are Acquired or Disposed Of, at 2, COM (1985) 791 
final, O.J. (C 351) 8. 
7 See, e.g., THE CONTROL OF CORPORATE EUROPE (Fabrizio Barca & Marco Becht eds., Oxford 
University Press 2001). 
8 STRONG BLOCKHOLDERS, WEAK OWNERS AND THE NEED FOR EUROPEAN MANDATORY 
DISCLOSURE 28, 32 (European Corporate Governance Network Executive Report prepared by Marco 
Becht 1997). 
9 Communication of the Commission: Financial Services: Implementing the Framework for 
Financial Markets: Action Plan, at 22, COM (1999) 232 (Nov. 11, 1995).  
10 Directive 2004/109/EC, On the Harmonisation of Transparency Requirements in Relation to 
Information About Issuers Whose Securities are Admitted to Trading on a Regulated Market, 2004 
O.J. (L 390) 38 [hereinafter Transparency Directive].  
11 Id. ¶ 2. 
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“should enable investors to acquire or dispose of shares in full knowledge 
of changes in the voting structure; it should also enhance effective control of 
share issuers and overall market transparency of important capital 
movements.”12  
From the recitals and the legislative history of the Directive discussed in further 
detail below, it can be inferred that the main objectives of the European ownership 
disclosure regime are (i) improving market efficiency and (ii) improving corporate 
governance.13  The following section explores the different mechanisms through 
which ownership disclosure can perform these tasks. 
A.  The First Objective: Improving Market Efficiency 
One definition of an efficient market is a market in which prices always fully 
reflect available information.14  The traditional argument in support of mandatory 
issuer disclosure is that  
“in the absence of regulation, the existence of externalities will result in 
market failure whereby too little information will be incorporated into share 
prices. Implicit in this position is the belief that mandatory disclosure rules 
results in meaningful issuer disclosures that would otherwise not be 
                                                
12 Id. ¶ 18. 
13 Cf. EILÌS FERRAN, BUILDING AN EU SECURITIES MARKET 127, 130 (Cambridge University 
Press 2004) 130 (identifying improving share price accuracy and addressing corporate governance 
agency problems as the two key functions of issuer disclosure requirements, and stating that the EU 
issuer disclosure regime is largely designed with a view to improving the accuracy of securities prices 
in the interests of investor protection and market efficiency, but that is has recently started explicitly 
addressing corporate governance disclosures).  
This paper does not separately address the issue of investor protection. For a compelling 
argument that disclosure is irrelevant to investor protection, see Merritt B. Fox, Civil Liability and 
Mandatory Disclosure, 109 Colum. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 17, available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1115361). See also Gaëtane Schaeken Willemaers (forthcoming 2009) 
(manuscript, on file with author) (developing a similar argument in the European context); PAUL 
DAVIES, THE TAKE-OVER BIDDER AND THE POLICY OF DISCLOSURE, in: EUROPEAN INSIDER DEALING 
(Klaus Hopt & Eddy Wymeersch eds., Butterworths 1991), at 261 (noting that ownership disclosure 
may be thought to contribute to investor confidence, but developing this argument by stating that the 
focus of the (UK) disclosure rules is on informing the market of certain important facts so that other 
actors can take appropriate decisions, thus promoting efficiency). 
For reasons of space, neither does this paper discus how market efficiency and good corporate 
governance can lower the cost of capital. For a discussion, see, e.g., Allen Ferrell, The Case for 
Mandatory Disclosure in Securities Regulation around the World, 2 Brook. J. Corp., Fin. & Com. 
L. 81, 93 (2007) (the title of which has provided loose inspiration for the title of this paper); Rafael La 
Porta, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, What Works in Securities Laws?, 61 J. Fin. 1, 
19 (2006). 
14 Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. 
Fin. 383 (1970). 
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forthcoming and that these disclosures add to share price accuracy.”15  
An important study has tested this claim empirically by studying the impact of 
enhanced issuer disclosure requirements.16  The authors distinguish between the 
concept of “price accuracy,” which refers to the extent to which share prices offer a 
good prediction of firms’ future cash flows, and “share price informedness”: the 
extent to which a share price reflects the available fundamental information.17  They 
define “fundamental information” as information that helps in predicting future cash 
flows more precisely.18  The results of the study suggest that share prices became more 
informed as a result of the enhanced disclosure requirements, which is interpreted as 
evidence that mandatory issuer disclosure can increase share price accuracy and share 
price informedness.19  
To determine whether mandatory ownership disclosure could yield similar 
benefits, the key questions are (1) whether information on major shareholdings 
constitutes fundamental information, and (2) whether disclosure of major transactions 
can be instrumental in conveying other, underlying fundamental information to the 
market.20  The remainder of this section shows that both are true. 
1. Transparency of the Voting Structure 
According to the Transparency Directive, disclosure of major holdings should 
enable investors “to acquire or dispose of shares in full knowledge of changes in the 
voting structure.”21  It is useful here to distinguish between the voting structure and 
                                                
15 Fox et al., supra note 4, at 342. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 345, 350. 
18 Id. at 348. 
19 Id. at 368. 
20 An important question in the debate on mandatory issuer disclosure is whether it is necessary to 
mandate issuers to disclose information in order for such information to be impounded in share prices. 
Some scholars have argued that issuers can be expected to voluntarily disclose their private information 
as a signal of their products' quality. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market 
Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 Yale L.J. 2359, 2373-80 (1998). Even if this argument holds 
true for issuers, it is doubtful whether it does so for shareholders, given the difference in incentives 
between them. For this reason, it is assumed in this paper that a market solution is unlikely to produce 
a socially desirable level of ownership disclosure. 
21 Transparency Directive, supra note 10, ¶ 2. 
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changes in the voting structure. 
a. The Voting Structure 
The voting structure determines who controls the company, at least to a large 
extent.22  Information on the voting structure constitutes fundamental information, 
because future cash flows may vary depending on the allocation of control. One way 
to see how is by looking through the paradigm of agency theory. This shows that 
different control patterns entail different agency costs, as illustrated by the following 
classic examples: 
In firms with dispersed ownership, no individual shareholder has a strong enough 
incentive to devote resources to ensure that management acts in the interest of the 
shareholder.23  Hence, control is in the hands of management. This implies a risk of 
managerial slacking, which is a source of agency costs.24  By contrast, in firms with 
concentrated ownership the controlling shareholder has a strong incentive to monitor 
management, as do smaller blockholders.25  Of course, not all blockholders may find it 
worthwhile to engage in monitoring.26  But to the extent they do, they could reduce 
agency costs.  
At the same time, blockholders could be a source of new agency costs, notably by 
extracting private benefits (e.g., tunneling).27  There is also a risk of over-monitoring, 
which may discourage management from showing initiative.28  In practice, the 
                                                
22 See infra note 254 and accompanying text. 
23 Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory 
of the Corporation, 11 Bell J. Econ. 42 (1980).  
24 ADOLPH A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY 112-116 (New York, Harcourt, Brace & World Inc. 1967); Michael C. Jensen & William 
H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. 
Finan. Econ. 305 (1976). 
25 See Anat R. Admati, Paul Pfleiderer & Josef Zechner, Large Shareholder Activism, Risk 
Sharing, and Financial Market Equilibrium, 102 J. Pol. Econ. 1130 (1994). 
26 See, e.g., Marc Goergen, Luc Renneboog & Chendi Zhang, Do UK Institutional Shareholders 
Monitor Their Investee Firms? 8 J. Corp. Law Stud. 39 (2008); Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fisch, On 
Beyond CalPERS: Survey Evidence on the Developing Role of Public Pension Funds in Corporate 
Governance, 61 Vand. L. Rev. 315 (2008). 
27 See HENRY HANSMANN & REINIER KRAAKMAN, AGENCY PROBLEMS AND LEGAL STRATEGIES, 
in: THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH, REINIER 
KRAAKMAN ET AL. 22 (Oxford University Press 2004). 
28 Mike Burkart, Denis Gromb & Fausto Panunzi, Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value 
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behavior of blockholders will largely depend on their type (e.g., private investor, 
institutional investor),29  on whether there are other blockholders30  and on the legal 
environment.31  
If investors expect the costs resulting from the ownership structure of a particular 
firm to outweigh the benefits, they may discount the share.32  Conversely, if they 
expect the benefits to outweigh the costs, they may be willing to pay more. Because 
of this trade-off, the impact of the ownership structure is likely to be different for 
each firm.33  The function of ownership disclosure is to enable investors to make their 
own informed assessment as to how the ownership structure of a particular firm may 
impact the value of the share.34  This also explains why securities laws typically 
                                                                                                                                       
of the Firm, 112 Quart. J. Econ. 693 (1997).  
29 See, e.g., Henrik Cronqvist & Rudiger Fahlenbrach, Large Shareholders and Corporate 
Policies, Rev. Fin. Stud. (forthcoming). 
30 Empirical studies suggest that the presence of multiple blockholders can sort different effects: see, 
e.g., Luc Laeven & Ross Levine, Complex Ownership Structures and Corporate Valuations, 21 Rev. 
Financ. Stud. 579 (2008) (finding that blockholders fight to form ruling coalitions so that they can 
extract private benefits); Benjamin Maury & Anete Pajuste, Multiple Large Shareholders and Firm 
Value, 29 J. Banking Finance, 1813 (2005) (finding that firm value increases when voting power is 
distributed more equally among blockholders). 
31 See Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: Complicating the 
Comparative Taxonomy, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1641, 1652 (2006); Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, 
Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1021, 1049 
(2007). 
32 See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Controlling Controlling Shareholders, 152 U. Pa. 
L. Rev. 785 (2003) (discussing the “controlling shareholder tradeoff”).  
33 This may explain why empirical studies into the relationship between types of ownership 
structure and firm value have produced mixed results; for an overview, see Steen Thomsen, Torben 
Pedersen & Hans Kurt Kvist, Blockholder Ownership: Effects on Firm Value in Market and Control 
Based Governance Systems, 12 J. Corp. Finan. 246, 251 (2006). 
Some view the ownership structure of the firm as an endogenous outcome of a maximizing process: 
Harold Demsetz, The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm, 26 J. Law Econ. 375 
(1983); Harold Demsetz & Belen Villalonga, Ownership Structure and Corporate Performance, 7 J. 
Corp. Fin. 209 (2001). However, recent tests seem to confirm the causal direction. See, e.g., Thomsen, 
Pedersen & Kvist, supra note 33; John J. McConnell, Henri Servaes & Karl V. Lins, Changes in 
Insider Ownership and Changes in the Market Value of the Firm, 14 J. Corp. Fin. 92 (2008); Stijn 
Claessens, Simeon Djankov, Joseph P.H. Fan & Larry H.P Lang, Disentangling the Incentive and 
Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings, 57 J. Fin. 2741, 2764 (2002). But see Rim Zaabar, 
Stock Price Response to Mandatory Disclosure of Ownership Changes: Evidence from France (2008), 
at 22 (finding no support for a causal interpretation, but offering possible explanations). 
34 Cf. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 24 at 313 (developing a model showing that when 
prospective minority shareholders realize that the manager’s interests diverge from theirs, the price 
which they will pay for shares will reflect the monitoring costs and the effect of the divergence between 
the manager’s interest and theirs); Donald C. Langevoort, Managing the “Expectations Gap” in 
Investor Protection: the SEC and the Post-Enron Reform Agenda, 48 Vill. L. Rev. 1139, 1152 (2003) 
(noting that the two functions of issuer disclosure, improving market efficiency and addressing agency 
problems, are inseparable insofar as a valuation decision is impossible without an assessment of the 
risk that incumbent management will divert to itself the otherwise expected stream of earnings). 
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require disclosure of the ownership structure in the prospectus and annual accounts.35  
There is an additional way through which the ownership structure may impact the 
value of the share. While the key component of share prices is the discounted value 
of expected future cash flows, they should also consist of a second component: the 
value of the vote. This value is determined by the likelihood that the vote will be 
pivotal in a contest for control and the price it will yield in such case.36  In firms with 
highly concentrated ownership the likelihood of a control contest will generally be 
small compared to firms with dispersed ownership. Thus, the ownership structure has 
an impact on the value of the share via its effects on the probability of a contested 
acquisition.37  
b. Changes in the Voting Structure  
If information on control is fundamental information, then so must be 
information on a potential shift in control. Indeed, the rationale of the US disclosure 
regime is “to alert the marketplace to every large, rapid aggregation or accumulation 
of securities, regardless of technique employed, which might represent a potential 
shift in corporate control.”38  This would enable corporations, their shareholders and 
potential investors to evaluate the possible effects of a change in substantial 
shareholdings.39  
A potential shift in control can impact the value of the share in any of the ways 
described earlier. The appearance of a potential buyer, for example a raider or a 
                                                
35 For the EU, see Directive 2003/71/EC, On the Prospectus to be Published when Securities are 
Offered to the Public or Admitted to Trading, Annex I, section VIII, 2003 O.J. (L 345) 64; 
Commission Regulation 809/2004, As Regards Information Contained in Prospectuses as well as the 
Format, Incorporation by Reference and Publication of such Prospectuses and Dissemination of 
Advertisements, Annex I, items 18.1-18.4, 2004 O.J. (L 149) 1; Directive 78/660/EEC (as amended), 
On the Annual Accounts of Certain Types of Companies, art. 46a (1) (d), 1978 O.J. (L 222) 11; 
Directive 83/349/EEC (as amended), On Consolidated Accounts, art. 36 (2) (f), 1983 O.J. (L 193) 1. 
36 Luigi Zingales, What Determines the Value of Corporate Votes?, 110 Quart. J. Econ. 1048 
(1995). 
37 Id. at 1048. 
38 GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 717 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 US 910 (1972). 
39 It would also enable evaluation of the possible effects of a tender offer. 111 Cong. Rec. 28,259 
(1965) (remarks of senator Williams). But see Jonathan R. Macey & Jeffrey M. Netter, Regulation 13D 
and the Regulatory Process, 65 Wash. U.L.Q. 131, 144 (1987) (suggesting incumbent management 
may be the primary beneficiary). See also infra note 123 and accompanying text; note 240 and 
accompanying text. 
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competitor, could signal an increased probability of a control contest. This should 
increase the value of the share, a prediction supported by evidence.40  Alternatively, 
the appearance of an activist hedge fund could signal an increase in monitoring, which 
explains why empirical studies show abnormal returns around the disclosure of 
purchases by hedge funds.41  
Conversely, the exit of an influential shareholder can signal a reduction in 
monitoring and adversely affect share value. This is illustrated by an empirical study 
of share price responses in France, which is characterized by family control of listed 
firms. The study finds negative abnormal returns following sales of substantial stakes 
and concludes that this is consistent with the view that monitoring by large 
shareholders increases shareholder value.42  In sum, the market’s response to the shift 
in control will depend on the past behavior of the exiting shareholder or the expected 
behavior of the incoming shareholder. 
2. Transparency of Capital Movements 
Disclosure of major shareholdings, according to the Transparency Directive, 
                                                
40 See, e.g., W.H. Mikkelson & R.S. Ruback, An Empirical Analysis of the Interfirm Equity 
Investment Process, J. Finan. Econ. 14, 523, 534, 535 (1985) (measuring the announcement effects of 
US 13D filings in the period 1978-80 and documenting that acquisitions by parties who have disclosed 
that they consider an acquisition of the target result in a statistically significant abnormal return of 
7.74% (average two-day initial announcement prediction error). 
41 Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, Randall S. Thomas & Frank Partnoy, Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate 
Governance, and Firm Performance, 63 J. Fin. 1729, 1755 (2006) (using a sample consisting of 1,059 
hedge fund-target pairs for the period 2001-2006, the authors measure effects of Schedule 13D filings 
and document abnormal return of approx. 2.0% on the filing day and the following day; afterwards, the 
abnormal returns keep trending up to a total 7.2% in twenty days. The authors conclude that share 
prices adjust to a level reflecting the expected benefit of intervention, adjusted for the equilibrium 
probability that the fund continues with its activism and succeeds); April Klein & Emanuel Zur, 
Entrepreneurial Shareholder Activism: Hedge Funds and Other Private Investors, 64 J. Fin 187, 208 
(2009) (finding statistically significant mean market-adjusted returns of 7.2% over the [–30, +30] 
window around filing and concluding that the market perceives substantial benefits upon learning that a 
firm is targeted by a hedge fund activist). 
In practice, the line between share price revisions due to the prospect of a takeover and revisions 
due to the prospect of shareholder activism is somewhat blurry. Brav et al., at 1758, show that 
acquisitions by hedge funds that can be interpreted as a prelude to a sale of the target company yield the 
highest returns relative to other types of activism. These findings are consistent with an empirical 
study by Robin M. Greenwood & Michael Schor, Investor Activism and Takeovers, J. Finan. Econ. 
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 29, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1003792). 
42 Zaabar, supra note 33, at 18 (finding statistically significant abnormal returns of -2.33% during 
the [-1, +3] window around the disclosure). 
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should also enhance “overall market transparency of important capital 
movements.”43  As we will see below, such transparency may improve market 
efficiency through several mechanisms: 
a. Transparency of Economic Interest 
The European Commission’s initial proposal for the Directive envisaged that 
disclosure would not only be triggered by exceeding a threshold percentage of voting 
rights, but also by exceeding a threshold percentage of the capital.44  Moreover, when 
filing the notification, not only voting rights but also capital interests would have had 
to be disclosed. These provisions did not make it into the final version of the 
Directive.45  Nonetheless, it is instructive to consider the rationale of requiring 
disclosure of capital interest. 
According to the Commission, disclosure of capital interest would have reflected 
“not only the actual influence an investor on securities markets may take in a 
publicly traded company, but more generally its major interest in the company 
performance, business strategy and earnings.”46  The initial proposal also contained a 
provision stipulating that “[t]he proportion of capital need be notified only to the 
extent that the [home jurisdiction] allows multiple voting rights to attach to shares 
and the issuer provides accordingly in its statutes or instruments of incorporation” – 
i.e., in case of deviations from one share-one vote.47  Studies have shown that 
European firms make frequent use of such disproportionate structures, including 
multiple voting rights shares and non-voting preference shares.48  Apparently, the 
                                                
43 Transparency Directive, supra note 10, ¶ 18. 
44 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Harmonisation 
of Transparency Requirements with Regard to Information About Issuers Whose Securities are 
Admitted to Trading on a Regulated Market, at 43, COM (2003) 138 final (March 26, 2003). 
45 Accordingly, the various references to “capital” were deleted, with the exception of the reference 
to “transparency of important capital movements” in recital (18) of the Directive. This raises the 
question of whether this reference might have been unintentionally included. This paper assumes that is 
not the case. 
46 Id. at 18. 
47 Id. at 44. Article 4 (1) of Council Directive 88/627/EEC (the Transparency Directive’s 
predecessor), supra note 6, contained a similar provision. 
48 See, e.g., Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Corporate Ownership 
around the World, 54 J. Fin. 471, 499 (1999); M. Faccio & L. H.P. Lang, The Ultimate Ownership 
of Western European Corporations, 65 J. Finan. Econ. 365, 389 (2002); REPORT ON THE 
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Commission deemed it desirable that there be transparency of cash flow rights in 
these firms. 
Why do cash flow rights matter? Because they determine the extent to which a 
controlling shareholder will bear the cost of private benefit extraction and the benefit 
from increased monitoring. If voting rights exceed cash flow rights, this encourages 
private benefit extraction because a disproportionate share of the costs thereof will be 
borne by outside investors. Theoretical models show that disproportionate structures 
can distort the controlling shareholder’s incentives to make efficient decisions with 
respect to project selection, firm size and roles of control.49  Other models show they 
can distort the market for corporate control.50   
Conversely, higher cash flow ownership discourages private benefit extraction by 
making it costlier. It also provides the controlling shareholder with a greater 
incentive to monitor management and to encourage it to optimize cash flow through 
dividends. In sum, cash flow rights determine the extent to which the controlling 
shareholder’s interests are aligned with the interests of outside investors. The case for 
one share-one vote, therefore, turns primarily on its ability to match economic 
incentives with voting power.51  
Still, it remains controversial whether mandating one share-one vote would be 
socially beneficial, as illustrated by the hefty debate that has recently taken place in 
Europe over this issue.52  While it may be true that disproportionate voting rights 
encourage private benefit extraction, they also provide a cheaper way to monitor 
                                                                                                                                       
PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, ECGI, ISS EUROPE AND SHEARMAN & 
STERLING (2007), at 24, 25. 
49 Lucian A. Bebchuk, Reinier H. Kraakman & George G. Triantis, STOCK PYRAMIDS, CROSS-
OWNERSHIP, AND DUAL CLASS EQUITY: THE MECHANISMS AND AGENCY COSTS OF SEPARATING 
CONTROL FROM CASH-FLOW RIGHTS, in: CONCENTRATED CORPORATE OWNERSHIP (R. Morck ed., 
University of Chicago Press 2000), at 295. 
50 Sanford Grossman & Oliver Hart, One Share-One Vote and the Market for Corporate Control, 
20 J. Finan. Econ. 175 (1988). 
51 Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1911, 1945 (1996). 
52 This debate was ended abruptly late 2007 when Commissioner McCreevy announced he would 
not further pursue the issue. Speech by Commissioner McCreevy at the European Parliament's Legal 
Affairs Committee (Oct. 3, 2007). This decision was based in part on two academic studies: Mike C. 
Burkart & Samuel Lee, One Share -One Vote: the Theory, 12 Rev. Finance 1 (2008) and Renee B. 
Adams & Daniel Ferreira, One Share, One Vote: The Empirical Evidence 12 Rev. Finance 51 (2008). 
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management.53  As a result, the effects of shifting to one share-one vote are likely to 
vary per firm. The main objection against mandating one share-one vote, therefore, 
is that one size does not fit all. 
The case for transparency of disproportionality, however, is much stronger. 
Transparency signals that the controlling shareholder’s incentives are distorted, and 
thus enables investors to better anticipate agency costs.54  Some scholars even argue 
that as long as companies make adequate disclosure, there is little justification to 
restrict the ability to deviate from one share-one vote.55  Empirical studies confirm 
that outside investors price in the expected costs and benefits of disproportionality. 
They tend to positively value the incentive effect of cash flow ownership, while 
negatively valuing the entrenchment effect of disproportionate voting rights.56  This 
is consistent with the notion that disproportionality can impact the firm’s future cash 
flows, and that information on disproportionality is therefore fundamental 
information. 
b. Transparency of Trading Interest  
Transparency of “important capital movements” may also enable the market to 
understand the interest in the share. As we will see below, disclosure of major 
transactions can be instrumental in conveying other, underlying fundamental 
information to the market, thereby accelerating the process whereby such 
information is impounded in share prices. 
                                                
53 For a discussion of the costs associated with holding large blocks and with monitoring, see 
Admati, Pfleiderer & Zechner, supra note 25. 
54 See HIGH LEVEL GROUP OF COMPANY LAW EXPERTS, REPORT ON ISSUES RELATED TO 
TAKEOVER BIDS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (2002), at 25. 
55 Arman Khachaturyan, Trapped in Delusions: Democracy, Fairness and the One-Share-One-Vote 
Rule in the European Union, 8 EBOR 335, 357 (2007). 
56 See Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Investor 
Protection and Corporate Valuation, 57 J. Fin. 1147 (2002) (finding higher valuation (measured by 
Tobin's Q) of firms with higher cash flow ownership by the controlling shareholder); Claessens et al., 
supra note 33, at 2755 (using a sample of East Asian firms and finding that for the largest shareholders, 
the difference between control rights and cash flow rights is associated with a value discount, and the 
discount generally increases with the size of the wedge and that firm value decreases when the control 
rights of the largest shareholder exceed its cash flow ownership); Tatiana Nenova, The Value of 
Corporate Voting Rights and Control: A Cross-Country Analysis, 68 J. Finan. Econ. 325, 327 (2003) 
(showing that where private benefit extraction is expected to be high, non-voting shares trade at a deep 
discount over voting shares). 
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The starting point of this line of reasoning is that investors may possess 
fundamental information that is not yet impounded in share prices. Of course, in a 
perfectly efficient market this would not be possible. But the evidence suggests that 
equity markets are merely semi-strong form efficient with respect to easily obtained 
and easily interpreted information.57  This means there is still money to be made by 
trading on information that, although public, is hard to obtain or interpret. Traders 
with the resources to gather and analyze such information might conclude that the 
share is overvalued or undervalued and capitalize on this insight by selling or buying 
shares, respectively.58  
Once the investor starts trading, the fundamental information is impounded in the 
share price through several mechanisms. First, even in liquid markets major shifts in 
supply and demand can impact the share price directly, pushing the share price 
towards a new equilibrium.59  Second, the resulting movement in share price may 
enable price decoding by other traders who suspect the trading against the market 
signals the presence of fundamental information and start trading in the same 
direction.60  Third, the trading may enable trade decoding.61   
Trade decoding occurs when the attention of other traders is captured by unusual 
trades. Whether such trades signal the presence of fundamental information will 
depend on factors such as the volume of the trades, the sequence of trades, the 
purpose of the trades, the resulting ownership level and last but not least, the identity 
of the trader – Warren Buffet is but one example of an investor perceived to be well 
informed.62  If other traders become convinced the trades are driven by fundamental 
information, they will start mimicking the informed trader. As a result, the process 
                                                
57 LARRY HARRIS, TRADING & EXCHANGES 240 (Oxford University Press 2003). 
58 See Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities Regulation, 55 
Duke L.J. 711, 723 (2006) (referring to this type of traders as “information traders,” comprising 
sophisticated professional investors and analysts). 
59 Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 Va. L. 
Rev. 549, 570 (1984). 
60 Id. at 575. 
61 Id. 
62 See Aslihan Bozcuk & M. Ameziane Lasfer, The Information Content of Institutional Trades on 
the London Stock Exchange, 40 J. Finan. Quant. Anal. 621, 638 (2005); David Easley & Maureen 
O'Hara, Price, Trade Size, and Information in Securities Markets, 19 J. Finan. Econ. 69 (1987); 
David Hirshleifer & Siew Hong Teoh, Herd Behaviour and Cascading in Capital Markets: a Review 
and Synthesis, 9 Europ. Finan. Manage. 25, 48 (2003). 
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whereby the fundamental information is impounded in the share price is accelerated. 
How do uninformed traders become aware of unusual trades? Potential sources are 
the trading book and the stock exchange’s transaction reporting system, but these 
offer limited insight. Traders are able to conceal the volume of their transaction by 
conducting a series of smaller transactions over time or placing iceberg orders.63  They 
are also able to remain anonymous, through the use of intermediaries or by trading in 
so-called dark pools, trading venues that do not publicly display bid and offer quotes.64  
Finally, they are not required to disclose their intentions or their resulting ownership 
level. 
This brings us to an alternative means through which uninformed traders are 
alerted: public disclosure of major transactions. Consider the disclosure by a passive 
mutual fund manager that it has sold its substantial stake in a portfolio company. The 
sale might be driven by a need for liquidity or a desire to rebalance the portfolio. But 
it might also be driven by the possession of fundamental information. Thus, the 
market might interpret the sale as a signal that the share is overvalued. 
Whether there is marginal value in mandating disclosure of major transactions 
depends on how rapidly the fundamental information driving the transactions is 
impounded in the share price. If the fundamental information becomes fully reflected 
in the share price before the disclosure is made, there is little point in mandating 
disclosure. On the basis of a survey of the finance literature, the FSA recently 
concluded there can be benefits from disclosure in relation to market efficiency.65  But 
perhaps the most persuasive argument that disclosure has marginal value is that the 
market seems to think so. Empirical studies of announcement effects show abnormal 
returns on both transaction dates and announcement dates, even if there is no overlap 
between the two.66  
                                                
63 Albert S. Kyle, Continuous Auction and Insider Trading, 53 Econometrica 1315 (1985); Sugato 
Chakravarty, Stealth-trading: Which Traders’ Trades Move Stock Prices? 61 J. Fin. Econ. 289 
(2001). 
64 See Hans A. Degryse, Mark Van Achter & Gunther Wuyts, Shedding Light on Dark Liquidity 
Pools (manuscript at 3, 6, 13, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1303482). 
65 FSA, DISCLOSURE OF CONTRACTS FOR DIFFERENCES, CONSULTATION AND DRAFT HANDBOOK 
TEXT (CP 07/20) (2007), annex 2. 
66 Id. annex 3, at 14 (examining the impact on share prices of announcements in the UK in the 
period January 2006-August 2006 for a subsample of events non-overlapping with disclosure and 
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Of course, the abnormal returns could be the consequence of the control 
implications of major transactions, discussed earlier. In such cases, the transaction 
does not really convey underlying fundamental information; rather, the transaction 
itself constitutes fundamental information. So we need to take a closer look at the 
evidence and filter out transactions with control implications. This is difficult because 
it is not always clear upon disclosure what the control implications are. Two variables 
are particularly relevant here: the identity of the trader and the purpose of the 
transaction. 
US disclosure rules provide some insight into the purpose of a transaction, at least 
at the time of the transaction. Qualified parties who purchase shares without the 
purpose or effect of changing or influencing the control of the issuer file a statement 
on Schedule 13G, otherwise on Schedule 13D.67  This has enabled an empirical study 
that examines the differences between the same blockholder’s passive (13G) and 
active (13D) holdings. The study finds that not only filings of active holdings produce 
abnormal returns, but also filings of passive holdings, even though the returns are 
smaller.68  
By contrast, to draw conclusions from empirical studies with respect to firms 
listed in Europe, one will often need to rely on the identity of the trader as a proxy 
for control implications. For example, mutual fund managers may be less likely to 
monitor than family investors and more likely to gather and analyze complex 
information on the fundamental value of the share. But mutual fund managers too 
may act as monitors, and it therefore remains challenging to determine to what 
extent announcement effects are driven by control implications or by value 
implications. Empirical studies measuring the announcement effects of transactions 
by investors who are relatively likely to be perceived as informed traders document 
                                                                                                                                       
documenting statistically significant abnormal returns of 0.36% over the [-1, +1] window around the 
disclosure date). 
67 Exchange Act Rule 13d-1(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1. If the investor changes his intention after 
filing a Schedule 13G, he will need to file a Schedule 13D. For a description of the rule, see infra note 
157. 
68 Christopher Clifford, Value Creation or Destruction? Hedge Funds as Shareholder Activists 14 
J. Corp. Finan. 323, 329 (2008) (using a sample of activism campaigns in the US by hedge funds from 
1998-2005 and documenting statistically significant market-adjusted returns of 1.64% (passive) and 
3.39% (active) over a [-2, +2] window around the disclosure date). 
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abnormal returns, though again, they are modest.69  
What matters for present purposes, however, is not the magnitude of the 
abnormal returns. It is the mere fact that the market responds, at least on average, to 
the disclosure of transactions that are relatively likely to be driven by fundamental 
information. This is consistent with the notion that such disclosure can convey 
underlying fundamental information to the market and thereby accelerate the process 
whereby such information is impounded in share prices. 
One implication is that disclosure of short positions could also contribute to 
market efficiency. After all, short sales are particularly likely to be driven by 
fundamental information.70  There is evidence that disclosure of short sales triggers a 
significant market response.71  This suggests that disclosure accelerates the rate at 
which fundamental information is impounded in share prices.72  Interestingly, 
regulators across the globe have responded to the current financial crisis by requiring 
reporting of short sales to the regulator. Some have gone so far as to require public 
disclosure.73  Yet these measures appear to be primarily driven by concerns about 
market abuse.74   
Even if disclosure can accelerate the process whereby fundamental information is 
                                                
69 Bozcuk & Lasfer, supra note 62, at 631 (measuring announcements effects of institutional block 
trading activity on the London Stock Exchange from 1993 to 1999 and finding that buys by fund 
managers result in statistically significant abnormal returns both on the announcement date (CAR [-1, 
+1] = +1.17%) and in the post-event period (CAR [+2, +40] = 2.33%), and that large sales result in 
negative abnormal returns on the announcement date (CAR [-1, +1] = - 0.83%) and in the post-event 
period (CAR [+2, +40] = -2.39%)); FSA, supra note 65, annex 3 at 13 (measuring the announcement 
effects of sales by asset managers and documenting statistically significant abnormal returns (CAR [-2, 
+2] = - 0.39%). See also Steven R. Bishop, Pre-Bid Acquisitions and Substantial Shareholder 
Notices, 16 Australian J. Manage 1, 19 (1991) (measuring the announcement effects of acquisitions by 
financial institutions in Australia and documenting statistically significant abnormal returns (CAR’s of 
–2.0% in the month prior to disclosure and 0.27% in the month after disclosure). 
70 See Ekkehart Boehmer, Charles M. Jones & Xiaoyan Zhang, Which Shorts are Informed?, 63 J. 
Fin. 491 (2008). 
71 Michael J. Aitken, Alex Frino, Michael S. McCorry & Peter L. Swan, Short Sales Are Almost 
Instantaneously Bad News: Evidence from the Australian Stock Exchange, 53 J. Fin. 2205 (1998) 
(studying a market setting in which information on short trades is transparent just after execution and 
finding that disclosure of such trades causes prices to decline immediately). 
72 Id. at 2222. 
73 See, e.g.,  FSA, Short Selling (No 4) Instrument 2008/60 (2008). 
74 See infra note 196 and accompanying text. But see FSA, SHORT SELLING, DP09/1 24, 29 
(2009) (noting that transparency of short selling can improve pricing efficiency by conveying a signal to 
the market that a firm is overvalued, and proposing disclosure of short positions by individual 
investors to the market).  
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impounded in share prices, one should be cautious in concluding that mandating 
disclosure for this reason would necessarily result in markets becoming more efficient. 
One reason for caution is that, as the behavioral finance literature teaches us, 
investors may not necessarily respond rationally. The recent financial crisis has given 
skeptics further reason to doubt the market’s ability to correctly estimate 
fundamental values. Thus, the FSA recently warned that disclosure of short sales may 
cause herd behavior, triggering excessive sales and price declines.75   
Another reason for caution is that by reducing the rewards of trading on 
fundamental information, disclosure reduces the incentives to search for such 
information. As Grossman and Stiglitz observed nearly thirty years ago, “[t]here is a 
fundamental conflict between the efficiency with which markets spread information 
and the incentives to acquire information.”76  Moreover, investors who are reluctant 
to reveal their trading strategies may limit their trading activity to avoid triggering 
disclosure, which could adversely affect liquidity.77  Mandating disclosure also entails 
other costs, as we will see below. 
c. Transparency of Free Float 
Finally, transparency of “important capital movements” enables the market to 
estimate the size of the free float. In at least one European country this is an explicit 
objective of the ownership disclosure regime, and perhaps for a good reason: the size 
of the free float may impact liquidity, which in turn may impact the share price.78  
First, consider the link between free float and liquidity, that is, the ability to 
quickly trade large size at low cost.79  One can imagine this becomes harder as the 
number of free-floating shares becomes smaller. There is some research suggesting 
                                                
75 See FSA, TEMPORARY SHORT SELLING MEASURES, CP09/1, 10, 11 (2009); FSA, supra note 
74, at 25. But see Hirshleifer & Teoh, supra note 62, at 26, 52 (noting that practitioners and the media 
tend to conclude too easily that there is irrational herding). 
76 Sanford Grossman & Joseph Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets, 
70 Amer. Econ. Rev. 393, 405 (1980). 
77 For instance, hedge fund managers have expressed concern that disclosure of their short sales will 
encourage mimicking of their trading strategies by other investors: Peter Smith, Fund Heads Voice 
Short Selling Fears, FINANCIAL TIMES, Jan. 7, 2008. 
78 Explanatory Memorandum to Dutch ownership disclosure rules, Kamerstukken II, 2002–2003, 
28 985, no. 3, at 3. 
79 Harris, supra note 57, at 399. 
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that a decrease in the free float does indeed adversely affect liquidity, but compelling 
evidence is scarce.80  This is different for the link between liquidity and share price. 
Several studies have tested and confirmed the hypothesis that the more illiquid the 
stock, the higher the expected return, and thus the lower the share price.81  
The function of disclosure of major shareholdings, then, would be to enable 
investors to understand the implications of the size of the free float. Are there one or 
more large shareholders who are likely to hold on to their shares, for example to 
exercise control, and how does this affect liquidity? Taking into account expected 
trading costs, what is a particular share worth paying for? Mandatory ownership 
disclosure may help answering these questions.  
Of course, there are more direct ways of assessing liquidity, notably by looking at 
trading volume. Ownership disclosure therefore would seem particularly useful to the 
extent it can help the market interpret changes in liquidity. Consider the 
hypothetical where a reduction in the free-float causes a decline in trading volume and 
the decline in trading volume causes the bid-ask spread to widen. Market participants 
could interpret this widening as a signal that someone is trading on private 
information and may become reluctant to trade. If, however, they are enabled to 
interpret these developments as the mere result of a reduction in the free float, they 
may be more likely to continue to trade, thus contributing to liquidity and ultimately 
market efficiency. 
B.  The Second Objective: Improving Corporate Governance 
The analysis so far suggests that an appropriate degree of transparency of major 
shareholdings can improve market efficiency, primarily by enabling investors to 
anticipate agency costs. This might explain why a recent survey among institutional 
investors shows that they consider such transparency important for their investment 
                                                
80 Kalok Chan, Yue-Cheong Chan & Wai-Ming Fong, Free Float And Market Liquidity: A Study 
Of Hong Kong Government Intervention, 27 J. Finan. Res. 179, 181 (2004). 
81 See, e.g., Yakov Amihud & Haim Mendelson, Asset Pricing and the Bid-Ask Spread, 17 J. 
Finan. Econ. 223 (1986); Claudio Loderer & Lukas Roth, The Pricing Discount for Limited 
Liquidity: Evidence from SWX Swiss Exchange and the Nasdaq, 12 J. Empirical Finance 239, 240 
(2005). 
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decisions.82  Yet another explanation is that they consider transparency important 
because it can play an active role in reducing those costs.83  Indeed, there is a 
substantial body of literature discussing mandatory disclosure as a means to address 
agency problems.84  
Agency problems and the challenge to mitigate their costs form the centerpiece 
of corporate governance. In Europe, the High Level Group of Company Law Experts 
has emphasized the potential of disclosure as a mechanism to improve corporate 
governance.85  The Commission shares this view, as becomes clear, for example, from 
the recitals of its Recommendation on executive remuneration: 
“The disclosure of accurate and timely information by the issuers of 
securities builds sustained investor confidence and constitutes an important 
tool for promoting sound corporate governance throughout the Community. 
To that end, it is important that listed companies display appropriate 
transparency in dealings with investors, so as to enable them to express their 
view [emphasis added].”86  
In a similar vein, one of the aims of the Transparency Directive is to “enhance 
effective control of share issuers” by mandating ownership disclosure.87  As we will see 
below, there are two mechanisms through which ownership disclosure can improve 
corporate governance. 
1. Ownership Disclosure as an Enforcement Mechanism 
In the words of professor Kraakman, disclosure can facilitate enforcement insofar 
as it “discourages opportunism in its own right” and “permits other legal controls that 
                                                
82 Joseph A. McCahery & Zacharias Sautner, Behind the Scenes: The Corporate Governance 
Preferences of Institutional Investors (manuscript, at 30, 40, on file with author). 
83 Id. at 11. 
84 See, e.g., Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 1047 (1995); Fox, supra note 13.  
85 A MODERN REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR COMPANY LAW IN EUROPE, REPORT OF THE HIGH 
LEVEL GROUP OF COMPANY LAW EXPERTS, 33, 45, 95 (2002). 
86 Commission Recommendation 2004/913/EC, Fostering an Appropriate Regime for the 
Remuneration of Directors of Listed Companies, ¶ 3, 2004 O.J. (L 385) 55; see also ¶ 9.  
87 Transparency Directive, supra note 10, ¶ 18. 
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deter self-dealing decisions by corporate insiders.”88  To see how ownership disclosure 
can do this, it is useful to distinguish between firms with dispersed ownership and firms 
with concentrated ownership, as their need for enforcement is different. 
a. Firms with Concentrated Share Ownership  
Many European firms have concentrated ownership.89  In these firms, there is not 
a problem of “strong managers, weak owners” but rather of “strong blockholders, 
weak owners.”90  Because of the potential of private benefit extraction by the 
controlling shareholder and the resulting need for monitoring of such shareholder, 
disclosure of major holdings is particularly important for these firms.91  Two examples 
illustrate this: 
First, disclosure may expose the potential for trading on inside information or 
other forms of market abuse. Large shareholders can be expected to have access to 
inside information more readily than small shareholders. Under US law, holders of a 
10% stake are even deemed to possess insider information and their trading activity is 
therefore subject to stringent disclosure requirements.92  The European Commission 
had the same concern in mind when it proposed the rules on disclosure of major 
holdings; this would prevent “uncontrollable rumors” and stop “misuse of price-
sensitive information.”93  
Today, the prime instrument to prevent this is the European Market Abuse 
Directive, which contains rules aimed at safeguarding market integrity.94  The 
Transparency Directive has a complementary function by identifying shareholders 
                                                
88 REINIER KRAAKMAN, DISCLOSURE AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: AN OVERVIEW ESSAY, in: 
REFORMING COMPANY AND TAKEOVER LAW IN EUROPE (Guido Ferrarini et al. eds., 2004), at 96. The 
following discussion focuses on enforcement by shareholders and enforcement agencies, but in a broader 
sense transparency can have value to creditors, employees and other stakeholders. 
89 See Barca & Becht, supra note 7, at 19; La Porta et al., supra note 48, at 492; Faccio & Lang, 
supra note 48, at 379. 
90 Becht, supra note 8, at 4. 
91 Id. at 60. See also NIAMH MOLONEY, EC SECURITIES REGULATION 169 (Oxford University 
Press 2002); DANIEL GROSS & KAREL LANNOO, THE EURO CAPITAL MARKET 127 (Wiley 1999). 
92 Exchange Act Rule 16a-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-2 (2005). 
93 European Commission, supra note 6, at 2. 
94 Directive 2003/6/EC, On Insider Dealing and Market Manipulation (Market Abuse), 2003 O.J. 
(L 096) 16 [hereinafter Market Abuse Directive]. 
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who are not on an insider list but may nonetheless have access to inside information 
and may be tempted to use it. This facilitates private or public enforcement. 
Disclosure may also prevent those whose interests are exposed from engaging in 
abusive practices in the first place, consistent with the notion that sunlight is the best 
disinfectant.95  
Second, disclosure of the identity of the person who ultimately controls the firm 
makes it easier to detect diversion of corporate assets.96  This is especially true if the 
counterparty to a related party transaction is also listed, in which case ownership 
disclosure may reveal that the controlling shareholder holds a stake in both entities 
and opportunities for tunneling are exposed. 
To be sure, in many jurisdictions, issuer disclosure rules already require disclosure 
of related party transactions. But at least in Europe these only require periodic 
disclosure.97  What is needed is some degree of ex ante disclosure.98  This alerts 
outsiders to potential conflicts of interest, which may induce them to monitor more 
intensely. Again, this heightened scrutiny may also discourage the controlling 
shareholder from engineering related party transactions that are not conducted at 
arms’ length. 
A recent study by Djankov et al. offers a cross-country analysis of private 
enforcement mechanisms that govern related party transactions. One of the findings 
is that civil law countries tend to have fewer ex ante disclosure requirements than 
common law countries.99  The wider conclusions of this study have been nuanced by a 
study which shows that France, Germany and Italy provide a large array of remedies 
against self-dealing.100  But this study also confirms that disclosure requirements in 
                                                
95 LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (Frederick A. 
Stokes Company 1914). 
96 Ferrell, supra note 13, at 89. 
97 Directive 78/660/EEC, supra note 35, art. 43 (1) 7(b); Directive 83/349/EEC, supra note 35, 
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these countries are not ex ante.101  As long as this situation persists, disclosure of 
major holdings may constitute a useful form of ex ante disclosure. 
Empirical studies underscore the role of disclosure in mitigating agency costs. One 
study finds that high disclosure standards are strongly associated with lower levels of 
private benefits.102  This finding is consistent with the law and finance literature. In a 
recent study, La Porta et al. construe a “disclosure index” that includes ownership 
disclosure as a variable. They find that as disclosure improves, the size of the block 
premium decreases.103   
It is true that some claims made by the law and finance literature have been 
subject to criticism.104  But even scholars who have gone so far as to construe a new 
“shareholder protection index” have consistently included ownership disclosure as a 
variable.105  This means they too are of the view that ownership disclosure can 
protect minority shareholders, the principal argument made here and implicitly 
adopted by the European Commission.106  
Finally, while the importance of ownership disclosure in this context should not 
be underestimated, neither should it be overestimated. Shareholders who have amassed 
such a large stake that they are able to engage in abusive behavior are likely to be 
known even if they have not publicly disclosed their stake. Moreover, in terms of 
enforcement, ownership disclosure merely represents a first step. The quality of 
minority shareholder protection will largely depend on minority shareholders’ ability 
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to actually hold the controlling shareholder accountable. Still, the fact that 
mandatory ownership disclosure ensures that investors and regulators are timely 
informed of potential conflicts of interest, suggests it has marginal value. 
b. Firms with Dispersed Share Ownership  
While many European firms are characterized by concentrated ownership, there 
are also numerous firms with dispersed ownership, particularly in the UK.107  How does 
ownership disclosure reduce agency costs in these firms?  
Before answering this question, it is important to nuance the distinction between 
firms with dispersed ownership and firms with concentrated ownership. As pointed out 
by professors Armour and Gordon, we can distinguish two types of firms with 
dispersed ownership.108  One is characterized by retail ownership and predominantly 
found in the US; the other by institutional ownership and predominantly found in the 
UK. Multiple blockholders can together increase agency costs much like a single 
controlling shareholder can, by conspiring to extract private benefits.109  This risk of 
“intra-shareholder agency costs’ requires the same type of enforcement as in firms 
with concentrated ownership, discussed earlier. Armour and Gordon suggest that this 
explains why the UK has stringent ownership disclosure rules compared to the US.110  
In terms of reducing managerial agency costs, however, the function of 
ownership disclosure applies in roughly the same way to both types of firms with 
dispersed ownership. This is by facilitating the market for corporate control, the 
mechanism through which management is disciplined by takeovers and the threat 
thereof. 
To be sure, the tone of the political debate at the level of individual European 
countries suggests that, to put it mildly, vulnerability to takeovers is not always 
desired. Inevitably, this has ramifications at European level – the complicated 
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legislative process preceding the Takeover Directive springs to mind.111  Still, it 
appears that at least the European Commission believes in the virtues of the market 
for corporate control. The very reason it proposed the Takeover Directive was to 
create favorable conditions for the emergence of a European market for corporate 
control.112  One such condition is that the initial threshold for ownership disclosure is 
set at the right level, which can be explained as follows. 
On the one hand, ownership disclosure can positively impact the market for 
corporate control. First, by understanding who is in control and determining the size 
of the free float, potential bidders can estimate the likelihood that their bid will 
succeed. The High Level Group correctly observed that the lack of transparency of 
the ownership structure may result in malfunctioning of the market for corporate 
control.113  Hence, the Takeover Directive now requires significant direct and indirect 
shareholdings to be published in the annual report.114   
Second, transparency of major holdings enables the potential bidder to identify 
parties who could be approached for irrevocable undertakings.  
Third, disclosure enables other potential bidders to mount a competing offer by 
alerting them that a third party is amassing a stake in the target. Disclosure matters 
here since the larger the toehold, the smaller the likelihood that a competing offer 
will succeed. This is because the initial bidder will partially bid for its own shares and is 
therefore able to pay a higher price on the whole.115  A toehold can also offer a 
strategic advantage vis-à-vis competing bidders since the refusal of the initial bidder to 
tender its shares in a competing bid could hamper competing bidders’ ability to 
squeeze out the minority upon completion of the bid. 
The flipside of the coin is that mandatory disclosure of stakebuilding can 
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discourage the initial bidder from making a bid in the first place, at least when the 
threshold that triggers disclosure is set too low. This is because such threshold limits 
the size of the toehold a potential bidder can silently purchase and the gains he can 
realize as a result thereof.116   
The bidder’s gains from stakebuilding can be considered from different 
perspectives. From an efficiency perspective, they could be considered as a reward for 
the effort of searching for potential synergies.117  They could also be considered as a 
means to finance the relatively high bid premium that target shareholders will expect 
due to the free-rider problem associated with takeover bids.118  This way, the bidder 
will still be able to retain some of the gains from his monitoring upon acquisition of 
the firm. Even if a third party ends up realizing the synergy gains, sale of the toehold 
will ensure that search costs are made up for. From this perspective, by reducing the 
potential gains from acquiring a toehold, mandating early disclosure reduces the 
incentives to incur search costs, to the detriment of the market for corporate 
control.119  
An alternative perspective is offered by the Takeover Directive, which justifies 
its mandatory bid rule – i.e., the forced sharing of the control premium with other 
shareholders – by citing the need for protection of minority shareholders and 
emphasizing that shareholders should be treated equally.120  However, as argued by 
professor Enriques, such rule has dubious effects on minority shareholders’ welfare, 
precisely because of the chilling effect on takeover activity, and no justification in 
terms of equal treatment.121  Much of his line of reasoning applies equally to the 
limitation of a bidder’s profits from stakebuilding on grounds of fairness and equal 
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treatment.122  
Adding to the complexity is the fact that disclosure functions as an early warning 
system to management of the target, enabling it to respond, for example, by 
mounting defensive measures.123  Mandatory disclosure thus potentially undermines 
the market for corporate control.124  Yet disclosure can also be useful, because control 
contestability comes not only with benefits but also with costs. These include the 
costs of inefficient takeovers and of insiders responding to takeover threat by 
behaving myopically.125  Thus, some protection from takeovers may promote 
insiders’ incentives to increase firm value. Moreover, temporary defenses could 
benefit existing shareholders by strengthening the board’s bargaining position. Once 
the playing field is leveled, the board can negotiate a higher offer price in the case of 
a bid that undervalues the target. In addition, the board can encourage others to 
launch a superior bid. 
Outside the takeover context, early disclosure can make life difficult for activist 
shareholders, particularly in combination with tight rules on acting in concert.126  
Some commentators suggest Germany’s recent decision to lower its initial reporting 
threshold to 3% may have been driven by the controversial approach of Deutsche 
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Börse by hedge funds in 2005.127  In some countries, issuers are provided with 
additional tools to trace suitors. For example, UK listed companies have a statutory 
right to demand clarification from any person whom they believe to be interested in 
the company’s shares.128  One expert group has recommended the European 
Commission consider adopting such a right at European level.129  Still, this tool may 
prove of little help if the target is unaware of the stakebuilding. 
For policymakers, the challenge is to weigh these competing interests to achieve 
a balance that inevitably is “delicate and perhaps even unstable.”130  A study by the 
FSA concludes that overall, by minimizing toeholds and providing information on 
impending takeovers, ownership disclosure should improve the contestability on the 
market for takeovers.131  To the extent this is true, ownership disclosure could be a 
valuable mechanism to improve corporate governance. 
2. Ownership Disclosure as a Communication Tool 
Another mechanism through which ownership disclosure can improve corporate 
governance is by providing a communication tool. In exploring this mechanism, it is 
again useful to distinguish between different ownership structures. 
a. Firms with Concentrated Share Ownership  
One function of mandatory issuer disclosure is to enable shareholders to make 
informed corporate governance decisions, such as choosing directors or authorizing 
fundamental transactions.132  In Europe, both the Transparency Directive and the 
Shareholders’ Rights Directive explicitly aim to ensure that shareholders can exercise 
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their rights in an informed manner.133  In theory, ownership disclosure could benefit 
shareholders by providing information on conflicts of interest. For example, it could 
expose a link between a nominated director and the controlling shareholder, or that 
the counterparty to a transaction that requires shareholder approval is related to the 
controlling shareholder. However, in firms with concentrated ownership the 
controlling shareholder will, as a practical matter, determine the outcome of the vote, 
unless approval of a majority of the minority is required. This limits the extent to 
which ownership disclosure can improve the quality of the decision making process in 
the shareholders’ meeting.134  
b. Firms with Dispersed Share Ownership  
By contrast, in firms with dispersed ownership there is a more important role for 
the shareholders’ meeting. In these firms disclosure of conflicts of interest of large 
shareholders could influence the outcome of the vote. But there is perhaps a more 
important way through which ownership disclosure can improve the quality of the 
decision making process: by enabling communication between the company and its 
shareholders, and among shareholders.  
Knowing fellow shareholders enables shareholders to exchange thoughts, to agree 
among themselves and to effectively assert their rights.135  The ability for 
institutional shareholders to communicate prior to shareholder meetings is key if they 
are to play an important role in the governance of portfolio companies, as envisaged 
by the European Commission.136  But it may not always be easy to identify fellow 
shareholders.137  In many jurisdictions, shareholders will rely on ownership disclosure 
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for this. 
Communication between the company and its shareholders is also vital. In order 
for companies to effectively manage their investor relations, they need to have 
insight into their shareholder base.138  This was one of the reasons for the 
Commission to extend the scope of the disclosure rules to holders of derivatives 
granting access to voting rights.139  
There are, of course, other means through which a company can trace the 
identity of its investors.140  For instance, in the case of registered shares or 
dematerialized bearer shares the company may be able to track its investors down the 
chain of intermediaries. But in practice this may prove burdensome, in particular in 
the case of cross-border investments or separation of registered ownership from 
economic ownership.141  By contrast, an ad hoc disclosure obligation as imposed by 
the Transparency Directive puts the burden on the investor and thereby ensures 
timely disclosure of his holdings. Thus, while ownership disclosure in itself may be 
insufficient for a company to have a complete picture of its shareholder base, it can 
provide a meaningful contribution. This is evidenced by a survey among US firms, 
which shows that 25% of respondents learned of activist investors’ ownership though 
an SEC filing.142  
C.  Extending the Framework to Insider Trading 
The previous sections have described the mechanisms through which ownership 
disclosure by major shareholders may improve market efficiency and corporate 
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governance. This section extends the analytical framework to insider trading. It 
demonstrates that ownership disclosure by insiders essentially performs the same 
tasks, through the same mechanisms. 
First and foremost, disclosure of insider trading may improve market efficiency. 
To begin, the mere fact that managers own shares constitutes fundamental 
information. A survey among institutional investors shows that they consider inside 
ownership key in making investment decisions.143  Why? Presumably because the 
lower the level of insider ownership, the higher the agency costs could be due to 
misalignment between the incentives of outside investors and management.144  On the 
other hand, significant inside ownership causes entrenchment, which could increase 
agency costs. Again, disclosure, by signaling the potential for increased or reduced 
agency costs, enables investors to anticipate the effects of inside ownership. There is 
some empirical research suggesting that firm value does indeed vary according to the 
level of inside ownership.145  
Disclosure of trades by insiders may also contribute to market efficiency. This 
idea is reflected in the recitals of the Market Abuse Directive, which contains the 
European rules on insider trading and states that the publication of trades by insiders 
can be a “highly valuable source of information to investors.”146  First, disclosure of 
changes in the level of inside ownership allows investors to re-assess incentive and 
entrenchment effects. Second, disclosure may convey underlying fundamental 
information driving the trades. Even though the prohibition on trading on non-public 
information applies, managers can be expected to possess such information and their 
trades therefore potentially convey new information on the firm’s prospects.147  This 
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is evidenced by studies showing that insiders tend to purchase stock prior to an 
abnormal rise in stock prices and sell stock prior to an abnormal decline in stock 
prices.148   
It may come as no surprise, then, that markets tend to respond to disclosure of 
insider trading.149  Moreover, the evidence suggests that the direction and magnitude 
of the response depends on the information the transaction likely conveys regarding 
the firm’s prospects as well the expected incentive and entrenchment effects.150  
There is also a case for transparency of disproportionality between voting rights 
and cash flow rights. As with large shareholders, the extent to which managers’ 
interests are aligned with the interests of other shareholders is influenced by their 
financial interest in share price performance. Just as the incentives of large 
shareholders may be distorted if they have disproportionally little capital at stake, so 
may the incentives of managers who have hedged their equity interest.151  
Finally, disclosure of insider trading improves corporate governance, by 
facilitating enforcement. This mechanism is acknowledged in the recitals of the 
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Market Abuse Directive152  and the related Commission Directive, which states that 
the information is not only valuable to market participants, but also constitutes a 
means for authorities to supervise markets.153  
II. HIDDEN OWNERSHIP 
The over-the-counter equity derivatives market has grown exponentially over the 
last decade, with an estimated notional amount of $10.2 trillion at the end of June 
2008, more than half of which was accounted for by derivatives of European 
shares.154  Equity derivatives are regularly used by hedge funds to leverage their 
exposure.155  But there have been instances where hedge funds, as well as hostile 
bidders, have used derivatives to influence corporate control, without fully disclosing 
their interests.  
Although the terms of cash settled derivative contracts such as options and 
contracts for differences (Cfd) inherently do not stipulate a transfer of the reference 
shares, such contracts may, as a practical matter, involve actual shares.156  The reason 
is that the short party, usually an investment bank, will typically hedge its position by 
acquiring the reference shares. This raises two potential issues: 
A first issue is that the bank may be inclined to exercise the voting rights attached 
to the reference shares according to the preferences of its counterparty, for example 
a hedge fund. The bank will generally be indifferent to the voting rights, while the 
fund has an economic interest in the shares. The bank will thus have a commercial 
incentive to accommodate the fund’s wishes regarding the exercise of the voting 
rights. Yet under existing rules, the fund may be able to avoid disclosure of its ability 
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to influence control, resulting in a lack of transparency. 
A second issue is that a cash settled derivative contract, despite its terms, may be 
physically settled. Once the contract has expired, the bank will have to unwind its 
position by disposing of the reference shares. If it concerns a substantial stake, the 
bank may not be able to sell the shares in the market without depressing the share 
price. By instead transferring the shares to the counterparty if so requested, the bank 
can simultaneously avoid lower proceeds and accommodate its client. Again, under 
existing rules, the fund may be able to avoid upfront disclosure of its ability to 
eventually acquire the shares, resulting in a lack of transparency. 
These two issues have materialized, for example, in the context of a high profile 
battle between activist hedge fund TCI and CSX, a major US railroad company. TCI 
had amassed a significant stake in CSX partly through total return swaps (TRS), the 
US equivalent of Cfd, which it had not immediately disclosed. CSX felt this had 
enabled TCI to ambush CSX in the run-up to a proxy contest and sued TCI for 
violation of US securities laws. The case focused on whether TCI qualified as 
beneficial owner of the reference shares, in which case it would have been subject to a 
disclosure obligation.157  The key question was whether TCI had a “significant ability” 
to affect how voting power or investment power with respect to the reference shares 
would be exercised.158  
As to investment power, the court observed that TCI had significantly influenced 
its counterparties to purchase or sell CSX shares.159  This conclusion was based on the 
fact that (i) it was inevitable, due to the “very nature” of the TRS, that TCI’s 
counterparties would hedge the TRS by purchasing CSX shares, (ii) this is what TCI 
contemplated, and (iii) the counterparties did in fact hedge their positions.160  This 
also explains why TCI limited the size of its TRS with individual counterparties: to 
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avoid triggering a disclosure obligation on their part.161  Moreover, the court observed 
that the fact that TCI had the ability to agree to unwind the swaps in kind meant that 
the hedge positions “hang like the sword of Damocles over the neck of CSX.”162  
As to voting power, the court found there was reason to believe that TCI was in a 
position to influence the exercise of voting rights by its counterparties, especially 
Deutsche Bank.163  This finding relied primarily on the fact that while TCI had 
initially entered into TRS with multiple banks, it had subsequently concentrated its 
TRS in Deutsche. In doing so, TCI was motivated by the belief that it could influence 
how Deutsche voted its CSX shares.164  Remarkably, Deutsche next recalled the shares, 
which it had lent out, in order to be able to vote them at the shareholders meeting 
where the proxy battle would be decided. Whether it did so pursuant to an explicit or 
implicit agreement with TCI was, in the court’s view, a “close one.”165   
Ultimately, the court did not hold that TCI directly qualified as beneficial owner, 
but merely that TCI should be deemed beneficial owner because it used the swaps to 
evade the disclosure obligation. Still, the decision went further than the decision by 
German regulator BaFin in a recent case concerning the takeover of automotive 
company Continental by Schaeffler. Before Schaeffler announced its unsolicited offer 
in the summer of 2008, it had built up a stake comprising just below 3% of shares, just 
below 5% of call options and approximately 28% of cash settled equity swaps.166  Yet, 
while it essentially held a 36% stake, the composition of the stake had enabled 
Schaeffler to refrain from making any prior disclosure. Consequently, both the 
market and Continental were caught by surprise. Despite public outcry, BaFin 
concluded there had been no violation since it had been unable to find evidence of 
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position in CSX, and Deutsche Bank was involved with TCI’s initial plans for CSX. 
165 Id. at 58. 
166 Dirk A. Zetzsche, Continental AG vs. Schaeffler, Hidden Ownership and European Law - 
Matter of Law or Enforcement?, EBOR (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 7, 8, available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1170987). 
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agreements that would have triggered disclosure obligations.167  
These are not unique cases. Professors Hu and Black, who have coined the term 
“hidden (morphable) ownership” to describe the combination of undisclosed economic 
ownership plus probable informal voting power, have identified a number of cases 
across the globe.168  These have changed the political economy and spurred lawmakers 
into action. The UK Takeover Code now requires economic interests to be disclosed 
during offer periods.169  The scope of the general UK disclosure regime is about to be 
expanded along the same lines.170  Similar regulatory developments have occurred in 
Switzerland, Australia and Hong Kong.171  In other jurisdictions, such as France and 
Canada, regulators are contemplating amending the rules.172  Courts have also 
addressed the issue, for example in New Zealand and Italy.173  Nonetheless, the issue 
has only marginally received attention at European level thus far. 
A.  Existing Disclosure Requirements 
To ensure disclosure by the beneficial owner, the Transparency Directive extends 
                                                
167 Press Release, BaFin, No Breach of Reporting Requirements Identified in Continental AG 
Takeover Procedure (Aug. 21, 2008) (on file with author). For a critique, see Zetzsche, supra note 166, 
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169 UK Takeover Code, art. 8 (3). 
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CP07/20, AND FURTHER TECHNICAL CONSULTATION, CP08/17, 3 (October 2008); FSA, DISCLOSURE 
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171 Ordinance of the Swiss Federal Banking Commission on Stock Exchanges and Securities 
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173 New Zealand: Ithaca (Custodians) Ltd. v. Perry Corp., [2003] 2 N.Z.L.R. 216 (H.C.), rev'd, 
[2004] 1 N.Z.L.R. 731 (C.A.); [2004] 2 N.Z.L.R. 182 (C.A.); Italy: Sentenza Della Corte D'appello 
Di Torino Sezione Prima Civile 5.12.2007/23.1.2008, available at http://www.consob.it (technically, 
this case was about wrongful disclosure made by the companies involved when they responded to 
questions by Consob with respect to their intentions concerning the control of FIAT); see also Lisa 
Curran & Francesca Turito, Fiat/ Ifil: The Securities Law Implications for Equity Derivatives, 21 
JIBFL 298 (2006); GUIDO FERRARINI, PRESTITO TITOLI E DERIVATI AZIONARI NEL GOVERNO 
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disclosure obligations to parties deemed to have access to voting rights, so that 
“publicly traded companies are informed not only about security holders, but also 
about those who may effectively exercise lots of influence.”174  Consequently, 
disclosure obligations also apply when, for example, voting rights are held by 
controlled entities.175  Various criteria are used to try to capture the beneficial owner, 
such as “power to exercise dominant influence or control,” “discretion,” 
“instruction” and “independently.”176  Here, the Directive lets substance prevail over 
form. 
Disclosure obligations are also extended to parties acting in concert or to parties 
on whose behalf shares are held by a third party.177  Moreover, they are extended to 
holders of certain equity derivatives, because the Commission acknowledges that 
“[i]nfluence may be directly exercised on companies through shares, but also 
indirectly through financial instruments conferring the right to acquire or sell shares 
[emphasis added].”178  This suggests a more formal approach. 
Indeed, in the case of Cfd that do not grant a right of acquisition of the underlying 
shares at settlement, there is no obligation to disclose pursuant to article 13 of the 
Directive.179  This article stipulates that call options and similar instruments count 
towards the trigger of a disclosure obligation. But it only covers instruments that 
grant the holder, on maturity, “either the unconditional right to acquire the 
underlying shares or the discretion as to his right to acquire such shares or not,” which 
right must derive from an agreement that is binding under applicable law.180  This 
                                                
174 European Commission, supra note 44, at 25. Conversely, exemptions from notification 
requirements are available to parties who merely qualify as shareholder in name; see, e.g., Transparency 
Directive, supra note 10, art. 9 (4) and 5 (b). 
175 See Transparency Directive, supra note 10, art. 10 (e). Relatedly, the definition of “shareholder” 
provided by article 2 (1) (e) of the Directive encompasses persons who hold shares directly or 
“indirectly.” 
176 Transparency Directive, supra note 10, art. 10 (e) jo. 2 (1) (f) (iv) and art. 10 (f); art. 12 (4) jo. 
art. 10 of Commission Directive 2007/14/EC, Laying Down Detailed Rules for the Implementation of 
Certain Provisions of Directive 2004/109/EC, 2007 O.J. L (69) 27. 
177 Transparency Directive, supra note 10, art. 10 (a) and (g). 
178 European Commission, supra note 44, at 18. 
179 See CESR, CESR’S FINAL TECHNICAL ADVICE ON POSSIBLE IMPLEMENTING MEASURES OF THE 
TRANSPARENCY DIRECTIVE, CESR /05-407, 63 (2005). But see CESR, supra note 187, at 2 
(announcing that it will address the possibility of application of the notifications regime to derivative 
products). 
180 Commission Directive 2007/14/EC, supra note 176, art 11 (1). 
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formalistic approach does not take into account that in practice there can be a thin 
line between formal rights and de facto powers. 
Similar difficulties arise when applying the provisions regarding acting in concert 
to Cfd. paper 10 (a) of the Directive refers to the conclusion of an agreement that 
obliges the parties to adopt, by concerted exercise of the voting rights they hold, a 
lasting common policy towards the management of the issuer. Again, the emphasis is 
on the existence of an agreement, which renders it unlikely that a disclosure 
obligation arises if a bank votes while merely taking into account the preferences of 
its client.181  
Possibly, voting rights attached to underlying shares held by the short party could, 
under certain circumstances, be considered to be held “on behalf of” the long party 
within the meaning of article 10 (g) of the Directive.182  At least among German and 
Portuguese lawyers there apparently is consensus that a contractual scheme leads to 
the short party holding the underlying shares “on behalf of” the long party if the 
latter (1) bears the economic risk and (2) is capable of influencing how voting rights 
are exercised.183  On the basis of this interpretation, professor Zetzsche has developed 
a compelling argument that equity swaps such as those employed by Schaeffler should 
trigger a disclosure obligation under this article.184  
Whether this interpretation prevails across Europe, however, remains to be seen. 
In providing advice on the implementation of this article, the Committee of 
European Securities Regulators (CESR) has offered the example of a trust, which 
suggests a somewhat narrower interpretation.185  The FSA, in conducting an extensive 
analysis of Cfd in relation to existing disclosure obligations, did not refer to the article 
or to its UK law equivalent.186  Nor does the fact that market participants, 
                                                
181 CESR, supra note 179, at 29. 
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commentators and even the European parliament have called upon the European 
Commission to increase transparency suggest that current rules provide adequate 
disclosure.187  The following section explains why this is a concern. 
B.  Understanding Why Hidden Ownership is Problematic 
Part 1 has provided a taxonomy of the mechanisms through which ownership 
disclosure improves market efficiency and corporate governance. The following 
section uses this taxonomy a framework for analysis of hidden ownership. The 
analysis shows that hidden ownership severely undermines these mechanisms. Thus, it 
becomes clear why hidden ownership is so problematic. 
To begin with, hidden ownership distorts the view of the voting structure. This 
point is eloquently made by the court in CSX, which describes how accumulating 
shares to hedge equity derivatives may alter the “corporate electorate”: (1) it may 
eliminate the shares from the “universe of available votes” because the banks have a 
policy of not voting hedge shares, (2) it may subject “the voting of the shares to the 
control or influence of a long party that does not own the shares,” or (3) it may 
result in the shares being voted by an institution “that has no economic interest in 
the fortunes of the issuer” but “is aware that future swap business from a particular 
client may depend upon voting in the ‘right’ way.”188  
                                                
187 See, e.g., Synthesis of the Comments on the Third Consultation Document of the Internal 
Market and Services Directorate-General: “Fostering an Appropriate Regime for Shareholders’ 
Rights”, at 14 (Sept. 2007) (respondents suggest that the Commission address the issues raised by 
derivatives); CESR, FEEDBACK STATEMENT, CESR/08-66, 2 (2008) (respondents suggest that CESR 
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large shareholdings under the Transparency Directive to include (a) significant (3% or greater) short 
positions, and (b) also any derivative positions, whether long or short); letter from the European 
Association for Listed Companies (EALIC) to Commissioner McCreevy dated Sept. 14, 2007, at 3 
(describing lack of transparency caused by derivatives and asking whether CESR would support an 
extension of the scope of the major holdings disclosure provisions), available at 
http://www.europeanissuers.eu; Hu & Black, supra note 2, at 836; Moloney, supra note 3, at 195; 
Elizabeth Fournier, Europe Needs Coordinated Cfd Disclosure, IFLR, Oct. 2008; John C. Coffee, 
Regulators Need to Shed Light on Derivatives, FINANCIAL TIMES, June 29, 2008. 
188 CSX Corp., supra note 158, at 11. 
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Hidden ownership also distorts the view of changes in the voting structure. 
Consider the use of cash settled equity derivatives to facilitate a creeping takeover. 
Although a change in control is imminent, the stakebuilding is not disclosed and 
investors are unable to assess the implications for the value of the share.189  
Moreover, hidden ownership affects transparency of capital movements. First, 
the long party’s interest remains undisclosed. Yet, its economic ownership exceeds its 
formal voting rights, which means there is no increased incentive to extract private 
benefits. On the contrary, the long party will often have an increased incentive to 
encourage maximization of cash flow through dividends. To the extent the long party 
can influence corporate decision-making, it may therefore be risk-averse to a 
different degree than ordinary shareholders. Admittedly, lack of transparency of this 
fact appears to be of relatively slighter concern. 
Second, the heightened interest in the share remains undisclosed. If the bank 
acting as counterparty discloses its purchase of reference shares, the market may 
attach less significance to this than it would if the purchase was made by a hedge fund 
known for identifying undervalued targets. If the fund enters into derivative contracts 
with multiple banks and limits the size of individual contracts to avoid disclosure on 
their part, the market does not even learn of the increased interest in the share at all, 
other than through a possible shift in supply and demand. As a result, the fundamental 
information that may drive the fund’s transactions is impounded in the share price at 
a slower rate than if its transactions were fully disclosed. 
Indeed, one of the reasons cited by the UK Takeover Panel to expand the scope 
of its disclosure rules to economic interests was that this would enable shareholders to 
understand why share prices may be moving in a particular direction.190  But this 
argument is not shared by the FSA in the context of the general UK disclosure regime. 
In response to calls for greater transparency of Cfd irrespective of their control 
implications, the FSA has stated it does not have compelling evidence of market 
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failure in respect of inefficient price formation caused by a lack of transparency.191  
Third, hidden ownership may distort the market’s perception of the size of the 
free float. If equity derivatives are entered into with a number of banks and the 
volume of each transaction is kept below the initial threshold for disclosure, the free 
float may be significantly reduced because the hedge shares are effectively taken out 
of the market. Yet in contrast to the situation where one party amasses a stake and 
makes appropriate disclosure, the market remains unaware of this.  
Consider the case of carmaker Porsche, which late 2008 disclosed that it had 
increased its economic stake in Volkswagen from 35% to 74.1% through cash settled 
options.192  As a result, the free float had effectively been reduced to a mere 5.8%, 
assuming Porsche’s counterparties had hedged their positions by acquiring the 
underlying shares. Until Porsche made its disclosure, this reduction in free float had 
remained invisible because Porsche had not been required to disclose its stakebuilding 
and liquidity was offered by hedge funds who were massively betting on a decline in 
Volkswagen’s share price by borrowing shares and selling them short. As reported by 
the Financial Times, Volkswagen’s shares more than doubled after Porsche’s 
disclosure, as hedge funds, “rushing to cover short positions, were forced to buy stock 
from a shrinking pool of shares in free float.”193  A leading corporate governance 
expert observed that the incident “should get the politicians and supervisory 
authorities to think again about allowing this untransparent situation.”194  
Hidden ownership also undermines the mechanisms through which ownership 
disclosure improves corporate governance. Transparency of economic interests 
facilitates enforcement of the prohibition of trading on inside information, or, more 
generally, the prohibition of market abuse. Regulators worldwide have applied this line 
of reasoning recently when they mandated disclosure of short positions.195  So has the 
                                                
191 FSA, supra note 170, at 9. 
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merely give the market some indication of potential supply. To give the market an indication of 
potential demand, it would need information on the aggregate short position in a single stock. See 
FSA, supra note 74, annex 3, at 7. 
195 See, e.g., SEC Release No. 34-58785, at 8; FSA, supra note 75, at 10; FSA, supra note 75, at 
10.  
  43 
European Commission in a recent paper on hedge fund regulation.196  
The primary concern in the area of enforcement, however, is that the undisclosed 
use of equity derivatives can affect the market for corporate control, by putting the 
acquirer at an advantage over other players in the game. As we have seen, if the 
objective is to facilitate the market for corporate control, setting the trigger for 
disclosure at the appropriate level is key. On the one hand, a bidder's ability to use 
equity derivatives to acquire a toehold can facilitate takeover bids.197  But if the target 
company’s ability to bargain for a higher offer price is limited or if potential 
interlopers are discouraged from launching a competing offer, overall the market for 
corporate control may be adversely affected.198  
The market for corporate control does not operate solely through public offers. 
Control can also shift through contested director elections, as in CSX. A shift in 
control can even be initiated by a minor shareholder who puts a controversial item on 
the agenda. This is exemplified by the case of Dutch bank ABN AMRO. Early 2007, 
TCI (indeed, the same hedge fund as in CSX) initiated a shareholder vote on the 
break-up of the company. The resolution was partially adopted and while it was not 
legally binding on the board, it would set in motion a string of events eventually 
leading to the break-up of ABN AMRO as a result of a public offer by a consortium of 
three European banks. 
By using equity derivatives, shareholders who merely hold sufficient shares to put 
an item on the agenda of the shareholders’ meeting may in fact hold a much larger 
economic interest. They may also hold a smaller economic interest, which implies a 
risk of empty voting, discussed in the following section. In both cases, it is impossible 
to determine the relevant shareholder’s true interest and hence its incentives and 
potential influence. This raises real concerns for issuers, as evidenced by the fact that 
by late 2008, no less than 369 US issuers had amended their bylaws to require full 
disclosure of derivative positions by shareholders submitting a proposal or nominating 
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directors for election at shareholder meetings.199  
Finally, as far as the educative function of disclosure is concerned, a concern 
might be that equity derivatives make it more difficult for issuers to know who has a 
stake in them. Recall that this issue was on the Commission’s mind when it extended 
the scope of the disclosure obligation to derivatives granting the right of access to 
voting rights. Can the same argument be invoked to mandate disclosure of equity 
derivatives that may offer informal access to voting rights, such as Cfd? Issuers 
certainly seem to believe so.200  The FSA has dismissed this concern on the ground 
that it sees no evidence of a market failure here.201  But with barriers to cross-border 
investment fading away and issuers seeing their shareholder base becoming 
increasingly widespread, the importance of managing investor relations is only 
growing. Against this background, there may well be reason for concern. 
III. EMPTY VOTING 
Hu and Black have characterized as “empty voters” persons whose voting rights 
substantially exceed their net economic ownership.202  They describe how equity 
derivatives enable shareholders to hedge their economic interest and even create 
negative net economic ownership. Providing an example that by now is well known, 
they describe how a hedge fund, Perry Corp, held a large stake in a pharmaceutical 
company, King, that became the subject of a takeover bid. The fund stood to profit 
from a takeover premium, except that it was uncertain whether the deal would gain 
approval by the shareholders of the bidder, Mylan Labatories. To secure its profits, 
Perry took matters into its own hands and acquired a substantial stake in Mylan. This 
would enable it to vote for approval of the deal. Perry, however, hedged its stake in 
Mylan, leaving it with no economic exposure but full voting rights. Thus, it could be 
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Requirements, Sharkrepellent.net, Dec. 16, 2008. Available at 
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(calling for increased transparency, because, among other reasons, undisclosed stakebuilding through 
Cfd “leaves the issuer in the dark as to who owns the company”), available at 
http://www.europeanissuers.eu.  
201 FSA, supra note 170, at 9. 
202 Hu & Black, supra note 2, at 825. 
  45 
expected that in exercising its voting rights, Perry would be guided by its interests in 
the target rather than its interests as a shareholder in Mylan, potentially to the 
detriment of other Mylan shareholders. 
Hu and Black further describe cases of “record date capture,” instances where 
parties borrow shares prior to the voting record date in order to vote the shares and 
return them afterwards. More generally, they describe cases, in the US as well as 
Europe - in which shareholders have been able to exercise voting rights without a 
corresponding economic interest, apparently manipulating the outcome of votes in 
order to realize personal gains. Thus, empty voting potentially poses a serious threat 
to the quality of the decision-making process in shareholders’ meetings of listed 
companies, which explains why the issue has drawn attention from market 
participants,203  regulators (including the SEC)204  and academics.205  In spite of this, 
the issue has, again, only received marginal attention at European level.206  
To be sure, just as it can be legitimately questioned whether mandating one share-
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one vote would be socially beneficial, it can be questioned whether an absolute ban on 
empty voting would be. A study by Christoffersen et al. suggests vote trading may 
serve the socially beneficial role of incorporating more information in corporate 
votes.207  A recent theoretical study by Brav and Mathews takes into account the 
possibility that the vote buyer and vote seller may not have coinciding interests. 
Their model suggests that strategic traders adjusting their economic ownership can 
improve overall efficiency, despite the fact that they will sometimes sell short after 
the record date and then vote to decrease firm value.208   
Equally true, though, is that the question of whether there should be transparency 
merits separate consideration. Before answering this question, let us consider briefly 
the extent to which empty voting becomes transparent under existing disclosure 
requirements. 
A.  Existing Disclosure Requirements 
European Commissioner McCreevy, announcing he would not pursue one share-
one vote nor expand disclosure requirements, has stated that the Transparency 
Directive already contains ample provisions on transparency.209  Remarkably, this 
statement appears to have been based, at least in part, on two studies acknowledging 
that the Directive offers limited insight and that investors believe increased 
transparency may be necessary.210  The studies also point at the lack of transparency 
with regard to the decoupling of voting rights from economic ownership through 
                                                
207 Susan E. K. Christoffersen, Christopher C. Geczy, David K. Musto & Adam V. Reed, Vote 
Trading and Information Aggregation, 62 J. Fin. 2897, 2927 (2007). 
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securities lending and derivatives.211  
Indeed, the Directive offers hardly any transparency with respect to cash flow 
rights, and even less with respect to empty voting. Acquiring a substantial capital 
interest per se does not trigger a disclosure obligation, contrary to the US.212  The 
Directive also falls short of requiring disclosure of the number of shares held on the 
notification form, let alone arrangements affecting economic exposure.213  The fact 
that cash flow rights did not need to be reported under the precursor of the Directive 
was already identified in 1997 as a major reason why it was difficult to measure the 
separation between ownership and control in European firms.214  Unfortunately, the 
Directive has not changed this. Again, US rules go much further, especially for 
shareholders whose stake exceeds 10%, who are not only required to disclose the 
number of shares and options held but also other arrangements affecting their 
economic exposure.215  
Despite the limited scope of the Directive’s disclosure rules, the rules at the level 
of individual European countries may be tighter, given that the Directive allows 
this.216  While individual countries have indeed imposed stricter disclosure 
requirements in many respects, they have not done so in respect of economic 
interests.217  Only in a few European countries can a disclosure obligation be triggered 
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both as a result of acquiring voting rights and as a result of acquiring shares.218  
Moreover, only in about half of European countries are notifying shareholders 
required to report the percentage of share capital held in addition to the percentage of 
voting rights held, while there is no mention of reporting pure economic interests.219  
European countries have also taken divergent approaches with respect to 
securities lending. For example, in some European countries securities lending triggers 
a disclosure obligation on the part of both the borrower and the lender, while in others 
only on the part of the borrower.220  Taken together, this means that in some 
European countries the market might be unaware of both the fact that the borrower 
has no economic interest and that the lender no longer has the voting rights initially 
reported. 
A related question is whether the Market Abuse Directive requires disclosure of 
capital interests and hedging by insiders. Under this directive, a disclosure obligation is 
triggered in the case of transactions in the share or “derivatives or other financial 
instruments linked to them.”221  Moreover, the notification should include a 
description of such financial instruments.222  These rules thus have a broader scope 
than the rules under the Transparency Directive – pretty much like US rules on 
insider trading do.223  As such, they could provide inspiration for possible expansion of 
the Directive’s disclosure obligations, the need for which becomes clear in the 
following section. 
B.  Understanding Why Empty Voting is Problematic 
Using the taxonomy of the mechanisms through which ownership disclosure 
improves market efficiency and corporate governance as a framework for analysis, it 
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becomes clear that empty voting too severely undermines these mechanisms.224  
Empty voting can affect transparency of economic interests essentially in the same 
way as lack of transparency of conventional deviations from one share-one vote.225  
Indeed, the problem remains the same: the incentives of the shareholder who has less 
economic exposure than voting rights are distorted. In each case, transparency allows 
investors to anticipate the implications for share value. 
With respect to empty voting, however, the market relies even more heavily on 
the Transparency Directive for information. Information on most conventional 
disproportionate mechanisms is provided by an array of sources, including company 
statutes and initial and ongoing issuer disclosure requirements.226  This explains why 
the evidence suggests that the extent of private benefit extraction by controlling 
shareholders in dual-class firms is correctly anticipated; stock returns of such firms are 
not lower than those of single-class firms.227  These sources, however, will typically 
fail to inform the market if a wedge between voting rights and cash flow rights is 
created through market instruments instead of institutional instruments, not for the 
long term but for a short term, and not by insiders but by outside investors, whose 
voting behavior may nonetheless determine the outcome of the voting process. What 
is needed in those cases is ad hoc disclosure by shareholders rather than initial or 
periodic disclosure by issuers. Hence the pivotal role of the Transparency Directive. 
Perhaps even more importantly, disclosure of the potential of empty voting can 
facilitate enforcement. Transparency enables issuers, shareholders and regulators to 
respond to, or prevent, abusive instances of empty voting. If, for example, it 
becomes clear that a hedge fund with substantial voting rights but a negative net 
economic position is trying to block a shareholder resolution, this could spur the 
company or other shareholders into action, through litigation or otherwise. 
Moreover, the prospect of public scrutiny may discourage shareholders from engaging 
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in empty voting in the first place.228  The European Commission has already applied 
this line of reasoning with respect to sovereign wealth funds, which raise concerns 
that, in some respects, are similar to concerns over empty voters.229  
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
From the preceding analysis it becomes clear that, as a general matter, 
policymakers contemplating how to respond to hidden ownership and empty voting 
should not focus only on the most obvious problems caused by these phenomena, such 
as malfunctioning of the market for corporate control. Instead, they should take into 
account the whole range of adverse effects on market efficiency and corporate 
governance, as described in this paper. 
This observation should be particularly relevant to the European Commission, 
which is currently evaluating the European ownership disclosure regime, embodied in 
the Transparency Directive. The European Securities Markets Expert Group has 
suggested that informing market participants of significant changes in the voting 
structure is the Directive’s “exclusive” reason for being.230  But this paper has shown 
that ownership disclosure can improve market efficiency and corporate governance 
through various mechanisms. This means that the Commission should assess the 
extent to which each of these mechanisms are functioning adequately, taking into 
account their relative significance and interaction.231   
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Moreover, the analysis suggests that the Transparency Directive in its present 
form does not effectively prevent hidden ownership and that this severely undermines 
the mechanisms through which ownership disclosure improves market efficiency and 
corporate governance. This strongly suggests that the Commission should consider 
expanding the scope of the disclosure rules.232  Yet, while most of this paper has been 
devoted to discussing the benefits of disclosure, policymakers should duly take into 
account the potential costs of increased disclosure – beyond incremental compliance 
costs.  
By increasing market impact cost, for example, disclosure could reduce hedge 
funds’ incentives to incur the costs of searching for fundamental information and of 
engaging in activism.233  Given that preliminary findings suggest hedge fund activism 
benefits existing shareholders,234  regulators should caution not to unduly limit hedge 
funds’ ability to engage in activism.235  Fear that disclosure will prompt replication of 
trading strategies may also adversely affect liquidity. AIMA, which represents the 
hedge fund industry, has explicitly voiced this concern.236  
Still another cost could result from management of listed companies responding 
to information on stakebuilding through equity derivatives in a way that serves its 
own interest rather than the interest of the company and its shareholders. The 
mounting of defensive measures, for example, could adversely impact the market for 
corporate control.237  In the US, some issuers have already changed their shareholder 
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rights plans to explicitly include derivatives when calculating the level of beneficial 
ownership that triggers the poison pill.238  Issuers could also respond by filing lawsuits 
alleging inaccurate disclosures, the accuracy of which becomes increasingly 
contestable as disclosure obligations become more complex. Such litigation risk could 
not only deter potential bidders but also chill shareholder activism.239  
Indeed, the fact that issuers are among the loudest proponents of increased 
transparency should caution policymakers to carefully examine their motivations.240  
This is of particular concern given that the current financial crisis may have affected 
the political economy in such a way as to make policymakers even more responsive 
to issuers’ concerns over hedge fund activity.241  A case in point is the restriction of 
short selling, the efficacy of which remains controversial.242  
Similarly, the analysis has shown that the Transparency Directive sheds virtually 
no light on empty voting and that empty voting severely undermines the mechanisms 
through which ownership disclosure improves market efficiency and corporate 
governance. Again, this strongly suggests the European Commission should consider 
expanding the scope of the disclosure rules, while being mindful of the potential costs 
and unintended consequences.  
One such unintended consequence could be an overflow of information. With 
respect to securities lending, the European Securities Markets Expert Group has 
expressed concern that too much disclosure could be misleading by making material 
information less easy to identify, and could adversely affect liquidity.243  Moreover, if 
and to the extent empty voting enhances efficiency, as some research suggests, 
disclosure could improve efficiency but also reduce efficiency, depending on the 
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circumstances.244  This reminds us that any measure designed to address empty voting 
requires a thorough understanding of this phenomenon. Ironically, transparency may 
be exactly what we need to obtain such understanding.245  
In assessing the costs and benefits of increased disclosure, policymakers should 
also be mindful of the limitations of the law. As two prominent scholars have put it, 
 “the drafters of the disclosure rules are usually lagging behind market 
developments in ways of acquiring interests in shares without triggering the 
disclosure requirement, which developments go some way to mitigate the 
adverse implications of the rules for acquirers.”246  
Similarly, the chief lobbyist of the German hedge fund industry was recently 
quoted as saying that he saw no need for a regulatory clampdown of equity derivatives 
in response to cases like Schaeffler because “[n]ew types of derivatives or trading 
techniques would emerge that were not subject to this regulation.”247  These 
observations fit within a broader theory that law is inherently incomplete due to the 
fact that lawmakers are unable to foresee all future contingencies.248  The originators 
of this theory highlight the role for regulators as proactive law enforcers with an 
ability to adapt rules flexibly over time, an issue that will be revisited below. The 
inherent incompleteness of law also argues for a principle based approach rather than 
a legalistic approach. With this in mind, the FSA has extended the scope of its new 
disclosure rules to any financial instruments that have “a similar economic effect” as 
financial instruments that would trigger disclosure.249  
Finally, policymakers should assess whether existing rules are adequately enforced. 
As with any ad hoc disclosure obligation, because recipients do not expect particular 
disclosures in advance, vigorous enforcement is key to ensure compliance.250  Focus 
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on enforcement by the European Commission is especially warranted in view of the 
recent accession of a host of Eastern European countries to the European Union. 
Although most of these countries had adopted a 5% disclosure threshold by 2002, an 
empirical study found that in most of these countries the identity of the ultimate 
owner was still undisclosed due to the laxity in regulation or enforcement of 
disclosure.251  A related study found substantial variations across Eastern European 
countries in what companies disclose about their corporate governance arrangements, 
and concluded that while accession to the European Union has been successful in 
transforming the laws on the books in these countries, implementation at firm level is 
still lagging.252  
CONCLUSION 
This paper has explored the fundamental question of why we have ownership 
disclosure rules. Using the European ownership disclosure regime as an example, the 
paper has first identified two main objectives of ownership disclosure rules: improving 
market efficiency and corporate governance. The paper has shown that mandatory 
ownership disclosure can perform these tasks through various mechanisms. Disclosure 
of the voting structure as well as changes in the voting structure may inform share 
prices. The same applies for disclosure of capital movements, which can create 
transparency of economic interests of shareholders, of trading interest and of the size 
of the free float. Moreover, mandatory ownership disclosure may improve corporate 
governance, by enabling enforcement and by providing a communication tool. 
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The paper has further shown that the use of equity derivatives to exert 
undisclosed influence on issuers or to facilitate creeping acquisitions (“hidden 
ownership”) severely undermines the mechanisms through which ownership disclosure 
improves market efficiency and corporate governance. The same is true for the use 
of equity derivatives, securities lending or short selling to hedge economic exposure 
while retaining full voting rights (“empty voting”). Although more than ten years 
have passed since the seminal study of ownership disclosure in Europe, the key 
question raised in that study remains the same: is the definition of control sufficiently 
narrow to pin down the ultimate controlling agent?253  This paper has argued that 
financial innovation causes the answer to be negative, which suggests that expansion 
of the rules is warranted. 
Three issues are not addressed in this paper, but nonetheless merit careful 
consideration. First, while the paper has identified benefits as well as costs of 
disclosure, it does not offer an exhaustive cost-benefit analysis. Indeed, by 
complicating the taxonomy the paper may have presented policymakers with more 
questions than answers. But at least this should enable an evaluation of the disclosure 
regime that takes into account all relevant aspects. 
Second, the paper has largely assumed that the voting structure determines who 
controls the company. But this is a simplification of reality. Shareholders and other 
stakeholders can exert influence over issuers in a variety of ways, which explains why 
accounting and antitrust provisions typically use broader, more substantive concepts 
of control. This nuance has gained weight as governments have responded to the 
current financial crisis by injecting huge amounts of capital in troubled financial 
institutions. Late 2008, for example, the Dutch State injected EUR 10 billion in ING, 
one of Europe’s largest financial institutions.254  It did so through the purchase of 
non-voting core Tier-1 securities. As part of the deal, the State obtained the right to 
nominate two members for ING’s supervisory board with special approval rights. In 
some respects, the State can now exert more influence over ING than any shareholder 
can. Yet it does not hold a single share and its influence remains invisible if we focus 
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only on voting rights. This shows the limitations of using voting power as a proxy for 
control and represents an interesting avenue for further research. 
Third and finally, while the paper suggests that legislative action could be 
conducive to realizing the objectives of the European ownership disclosure regime – 
improving market efficiency and corporate governance -, it does not address the 
question of whether action should be taken at European level or whether this should 
be left to individual European countries. The fact that the regime provides for 
minimum harmonization raises the question of whether it would be socially more 
beneficial to rely on regulatory competition between countries. The swiftness with 
which the UK has expanded its disclosure rules suggests this might be a fruitful 
approach. Indeed, its rapid response may be seen as an example of what professor 
Deakin refers to as “efficient evolutionary adaptation of systems to changing 
environmental conditions,” facilitated by a directive that provides the conditions for 
local diversity and thus enables search and learning processes.255  
While it goes beyond the scope of this paper to address this question, two 
preliminary remarks can be made, taking into account the ambition of creating a 
single European market that inspired the European Commission to establish the 
disclosure regime. First, minimum harmonization presupposes that mere 
implementation at national level of the European rules creates sufficient 
transparency. Yet this paper has shown the floor is currently set too low, which may 
deter cross-border investment.256  Second, the current level of divergence may deter 
cross-border investment by institutional investors, who are faced with no less than 27 
different ownership disclosure regimes they potentially have to comply with.257  This 
raises concerns the Commission should duly take into account when determining its 
future policy on ownership disclosure. 
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